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“[N]either a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.  
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or pre-
fer one religion over another.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court and lower federal courts following Supreme 
Court doctrine have held consistently that local land use priorities are 
most appropriately decided by local governments.2  Local land use 
regulation is a crucial element of the federalism that is a fundamental 
basis of the United States’ constitutional structure.3  After all, if there 
is anything that is truly local, it is land use.  In addition, the Supreme 
 
 1. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963) (quoting 
Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)). 
 2. See Marci A. Hamilton, The Constitutional Limitations on Congress’s Power 
over Local Land Use: Why the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
Is Unconstitutional, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 366, 368 (2009) [hereinafter Constitutional 
Limitations on Congress’s Power over Local Land Use]; see, e.g., Kelo v. City of New 
London, 545 U.S. 469, 482–84 (2005) (emphasizing the great respect the federal gov-
ernment owes to state legislatures and state courts in local land use); Solid Waste 
Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) 
(“[R]egulation of land use [is] a function traditionally performed by local govern-
ments.” (quoting Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994)); 
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Miss., 456 U.S. 742, 767 n.30 (1982) 
(“[R]egulation of land use is perhaps the quintessential state activity.”); Schad v. 
Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981) (“The power of local govern-
ments to zone and control land use is undoubtedly broad and its proper exercise is an 
essential aspect of achieving a satisfactory quality of life in both urban and rural 
communities.”); Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 440 
U.S. 391, 402 (1979) (“The regulation of land use is traditionally a function per-
formed by local governments.”); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. 
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263–65 (1977); Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 
(1974); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608–09 (1927) (stating that local government is 
best equipped to deal with the land use regulation); Murphy v. New Milford Zoning 
Comm’n, 402 F.3d 342, 348 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Requiring a property owner to obtain a 
final, definitive position from zoning authorities evinces the judiciary’s appreciation 
that land use disputes are uniquely matters of local concern more aptly suited for lo-
cal resolution.”); Congregation Kol Ami v. Abington Twp., 309 F.3d 120, 135 (3d Cir. 
2002) (“[L]and use law is one of the bastions of local control, largely free of federal 
intervention.”); Sameric Corp. of Del. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 598 (3d Cir. 
1998) (stating that local authorities are better positioned than courts to make land 
use decisions); Hoehne v. Cnty. of San Benito, 870 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1989) (“We 
also emphasize that ruling case law makes it very difficult to open the federal court-
house door for relief from state and local land-use decisions.”); Spence v. Zimmer-
man, 873 F.2d 256, 262 (11th Cir. 1989) (“We stress that federal courts do not sit as 
zoning boards of review . . . .”); Littlefield v. City of Afton, 785 F.2d 596, 607 (8th Cir. 
1986) (expressing concern “that federal courts not sit as zoning boards of appeals”). 
 3. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (“[The Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act] contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of 
powers and the federal balance.”). 
HAMILTON_CHRISTENSEN 7/11/2012  9:24 AM 
2012] RLUIPA IS A BRIDGE TOO FAR 961 
Court repeatedly has ruled that financial preferences for religious or-
ganizations violate the Establishment Clause.4  Neither of these two 
 
 4. See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696–
97 (1994) (finding that delegation of state authority to a religious group, via school 
zone creation, violated the principal of neutrality towards all religions and between 
religion and non-religion required by the Establishment Clause); Jimmy Swaggart 
Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 391 (1990) (“[T]o the extent 
that imposition of a generally applicable tax merely decreases the amount of money 
appellant has to spend on its religious activities, any such burden is not constitution-
ally significant.”); id. at 393 (“The Establishment Clause prohibits ‘sponsorship, fi-
nancial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.’” (cita-
tion omitted)); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 
573, 593–94 (1989) (“Whether the key word is ‘endorsement,’ ‘favoritism,’ or ‘promo-
tion,’ the essential principle remains the same.  The Establishment Clause, at the very 
least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on questions of reli-
gious belief or from ‘making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s 
standing in the political community.’” (citations omitted)); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. 
Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (“[G]overnment . . . may not place its prestige, coercive 
authority, or resources behind a single religious faith or behind religious belief in 
general, compelling nonadherents to support the practices or proselytizing of favored 
religious organizations and conveying the message that those who do not contribute 
gladly are less than full members of the community.”); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 
228, 244 (1982) (“[T]he clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one 
religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”); Roemer v. Bd. 
of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976) (“Neutrality is what is required.  The 
State must confine itself to secular objectives, and neither advance nor impede reli-
gious activity. . . . The State may not, for example, pay for what is actually a religious 
education, even though it purports to be paying for a secular one, and even though it 
makes its aid available to secular and religious institutions alike.”); Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 92 (1976) (“The government may not aid one religion to the detriment of 
others or impose a burden on one religion that is not imposed on others, and may not 
even aid all religions.”); Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 
U.S. 472, 482 (1973) (finding the Establishment Clause is violated where a statute au-
thorizes a state to reimburse nonpublic schools for expenses relating to internal test-
ing and examinations, which potentially contained religious instruction); Sloan v. 
Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 830 (1973) (finding a state law that provided funds to reimburse 
parents for a portion of tuition expenses incurred in sending children to nonpublic 
schools violated the Establishment Clause, as the program impermissibly advanced 
religion); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772 
(1973) (stating that the Establishment Clause protects against three main evils: 
“sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious 
activity”) (citations omitted); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (cre-
ating a three-pronged test to ensure a statute does not violate the Establishment 
Clause: “[f]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its princi-
ple or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, 
the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”) 
(citations omitted); Waltz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970) (“It is suf-
ficient to note that for the men who wrote the Religion Clauses of the First Amend-
ment the ‘establishment’ of a religion connoted sponsorship, financial support, and 
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 
U.S. 97, 103–04 (1968) (“Government in our democracy, state and national, must be 
neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice.  It may not be hostile to 
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lines of cases is in serious question, yet, when Congress enacted the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) in 
2000,5 it managed to cross both constitutional boundary lines without 
taking either into account. 
Congress ran roughshod over the Supreme Court’s established doc-
trine on local land use and the Establishment Clause when it enacted 
RLUIPA, which applies the heavy hand of the federal government to 
manufacture new and special privileges for religious landowners to 
override local land use priorities and interests.  It is a “free exercise” 
statute that too often strong-arms local governments to prioritize a 
particular religious applicant’s private vision over all other interests in 
the community. 
RLUIPA purportedly was passed to redress religious discrimina-
tion in the land use process.  The Conference Report stated: 
Churches in general, and new, small or unfamiliar churches in par-
ticular, are frequently discriminated against on the face of zoning 
codes and also in the highly individualized and discretionary pro-
cesses of land use regulation.  Zoning codes frequently exclude 
churches in places where they permit theaters, meeting halls, and 
other places where large groups of people assemble for secular pur-
poses.  Or the codes permit churches only with individualized per-
mission from the zoning board, and zoning boards use that authority 
in discriminatory ways.6 
Regardless of its proponents’ outlandish claims, this is a statement 
with a pro-religion bias and few facts to support it.  In a previous arti-
cle, I discredited the notion that there was meaningful evidence of 
discrimination against churches in the land use process before Con-
gress when it decided to intermeddle in ordinary local land use dis-
 
any religion or to the advocacy of no religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote 
one religion or religious theory against another or even against the militant opposite.  
The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and reli-
gion, and between religion and nonreligion.”); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103–04 
(1968) (stating that the Establishment Clause was intended to protect against abuses 
of governmental power, particularly the use of the taxing and spending power to fa-
vor or support one religion over another); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 216 (“[N]either a 
state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.  Neither can pass laws which 
aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.” (quoting Ever-
son, 330 U.S. at 15) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 
421, 431 (1962) (holding that the Establishment Clause is violated “[w]hen the power, 
prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious 
belief”). 
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006). 
 6. 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of 
Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy). 
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putes involving religious landowners with RLUIPA.7  There was no 
alleged evidence of discrimination offered by anyone other than a 
self-interested religious organization.8  The idea that religious institu-
 
 7. See Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Be-
hind the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 346–
48 (2003) [hereinafter Federalism and the Public Good]; see also Marci A. Hamilton, 
The History of RLUIPA, in RLUIPA READER: RELIGIOUS LAND USES, ZONING AND 
THE COURTS 31 (Michael S. Giamo & Lora A. Lucero eds., 2009); Caroline R. Ad-
ams, Note, The Constitutional Validity of the Religious Land Use and Institutional-
ized Persons Act of 2000: Will RLUIPA’s Strict Scrutiny Survive the Supreme 
Court’s Strict Scrutiny?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2361, 2393 (2002) (claiming RLUIPA 
is unconstitutional because the evidence presented by Congress did not “rise[] to the 
level of a ‘pattern or practice’ of discrimination” and “the legislative record depicts 
only sporadic conflicts between religious institutions and zoning boards”); Stephen 
Clowney, Comment, An Empirical Look at Churches in the Zoning Process, 116 
YALE L.J. 859, 863–65 (2007) (looking at an empirical study of land use decisions in 
New Haven, Connecticut prior to the enactment of RLUIPA, which revealed no evi-
dence of bias or discrimination based on religion); Joshua R. Geller, Note, The Reli-
gious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: An Unconstitutional Ex-
ercise of Congress’s Power Under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, 6 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 561, 583–84 (2003) (finding that “RLUIPA is an un-
constitutional exercise of Congress’s Section 5 authority because there is no convinc-
ing evidence of a widespread and persisting pattern of constitutional violations to-
ward religious landowners”); Ariel Graff, Comment, Calibrating the Balance of Free 
Exercise, Religious Establishment, and Land Use Regulation: Is RLUIPA an Uncon-
stitutional Response to an Overstated Problem?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 485, 501 (2005) 
(discrediting the Brigham Young University study relied on by Congress during the 
legislative hearings on RLUIPA, claiming that the study “does not support the exist-
ence of a prevalent, nationwide pattern of discrimination against minority religions in 
the land use context”). 
 8. See Geller, supra note 7, at 578 (explaining that the Christian Legal Society 
prepared Representative Hyde’s evidence) (citing 146 CONG. REC. E1564 (daily ed. 
Sept. 22, 2000) (statement of Rep. Hyde)); see also Religious Liberty Protection Act 
of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 151 (1999) (statement of Steven T. McFarland, 
Center for Law and Religious Freedom, Christian Legal Society) (stating that 
churches are being zoned out of cities because their ministries to the homeless are 
being reclassified as social service agencies); id. at 91–95 (testimony of Rabbi David 
Saperstein, Director and Counsel, Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism); Re-
ligious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearings on H.R. 4019 Before the Subcomm. 
on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 57–65 (1998) 
(prepared statement of Marc D. Stern, Director, Legal Department, American Jew-
ish Congress) (discussing distinctions drawn by land planners between tax-generating 
and tax-exempt properties); id. at 137–38 (prepared statement of W. Cole Durham, 
Jr., Brigham Young University Law School) (“The difficulty is that in far too many 
cases, as noted in the Schwab case quoted above, land use decisions are wrapped in 
neutral sounding language about parking, setbacks, traffic impacts, and the like, 
which may constitute substantial and tangible harm to surrounding property owners, 
but in too many cases merely serves as an empty verbal mask hiding illicit discrimina-
tory conduct aimed at the exercise of religion.  Thus, a lack of parking facilities that 
results in constant overparking of a narrow street, disrupting traffic and blocking 
neighboring driveways may constitute a genuine problem, but it does not justify ex-
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tions have been especially discriminated against in the land use con-
text is certainly not an assumption that everyone takes for granted.9  
For instance, there is evidence that what Congress has termed “reli-
gious discrimination” is no different than the burdens that secular 
land users face “navigating the discretionary zoning process.”10  That 
stands to reason in a society that is as solicitous of religious exercise 
as the United States has been.11 
Even putting the lack of actual evidence of discrimination aside, 
RLUIPA was always a cure in search of a disease. The First Amend-
ment was and continues to be more than satisfactory to punish and 
deter the type of discrimination that supposedly spurred Congress to 
take action.  Moreover, RLUIPA has proven dangerous, providing 
 
cluding a religious use from an area if adequate on-site parking is provided (as was 
the case in Islamic Center) or if the religious use is needed at the location in question 
precisely because of religious requirements that participants must walk to the service.  
References to increased traffic flows may constitute a genuine risk to safety, or they 
may simply reflect moderate increases as likely to result without the religious use.  
Rigid insistence on setback or bulk requirements may be unnecessary or may reflect 
an aesthetic concern that should give way to weightier religious freedom concerns.  
Building code problems may constitute substantial health and safety risks, or they 
may relate to matters that are routinely waived in a community.”); Protecting Reli-
gious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores (Part III): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 15 (1998) (statement 
of Mark E. Chopko, General Counsel, United States Catholic Conference) (discuss-
ing an instance in which a county applied the operational hours for commercial facili-
ties to churches, which would prevent a church from holding sunrise services or con-
ducting an Easter vigil mass); Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores 
(Part II): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 41–49 (statement and prepared statement of Richard Robb, 
Ypsilanti, Michigan) (discussing the effect of local landmarking laws on churches). 
 9. See, e.g., Matthew T. Sutter, Residential Religious Nuisance, RLUIPA, and 
Sic Utere Tuo Ut Alienum Non Laedas: “Like A Pig in the Parlor”, 5 RUTGERS J.L. 
& RELIGION 6, 34 (2003) (finding that prior to RLUIPA, zoning boards actually had a 
strong preference for religious uses in the community); Diane K. Hook, Comment, 
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act Of 2000: Congress’ New 
Twist on “Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick”, 34 URB. LAW. 829, 851 (2002) (“Re-
gardless of whether RLUIPA is constitutional or not, it is difficult to accept that 
there is a pervasive and widespread discrimination against religious entities attempt-
ing to build, buy, or rent adequate space in which to exercise their faith.  After all, it 
is difficult to reside in a community without being within a short driving distance of a 
community church or mega-church that occupies several acres of land.”). 
 10. Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Judicial Review of Local Land Use Decisions: Lesson 
from RLUIPA, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 717, 754 (2008) (noting that what Con-
gress might have termed “religious discrimination” is actually no different than any 
land-user navigating the discretionary zoning process, who might encounter discrimi-
nation, inconsistency, and corruption in land use regulation).   
 11. See generally MARCI A HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE 
RULE OF LAW (2005). 
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religious plaintiffs an outside advantage in zoning disputes to the det-
riment of local communities, neighbors, and residential neighbor-
hoods. 
In this Article, I will demonstrate how lower courts struggling to in-
terpret RLUIPA’s reach have transformed it into a weapon against 
mere inconvenience and expense.  This result—wherein religious de-
velopers utilize the statute to avoid generally applicable zoning and 
land use regulations by claiming that compliance would be expensive 
or time consuming—is not just a violation of federalism in the one 
arena that is truly local.12  It is also an unjustifiable financial boon to 
religious land developers, and therefore a violation of the Establish-
ment Clause.13 
The threshold question in every free exercise case, whether statu-
tory or constitutional, is whether the law imposes a “substantial bur-
den” on religious exercise.  The believer or organization bears the 
burden of proving that the law imposes a substantial burden.14  The 
 
 12. See Constitutional Limitations on Congress’s Power over Local Land Use, 
supra note 2, at 426–30; see also Shawn Jensvold, The Religious Land Use and Insti-
tutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA): A Valid Exercise of Congressional 
Power?, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 32 (2001) (raising federalism concerns with RLUIPA, 
stating that “[l]ocal governments are generally better able to respond to their constit-
uents’ concerns over land use issues than Congress or federal executive agencies,” 
and “Congress, by passing land use legislation, risks interfering with an area of law 
designed to be controlled at the state and local level”); Julie M. Osborn, RLUIPA’s 
Land Use Provisions: Congress’ Unconstitutional Response to City of Boerne, 28 
ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 155, 173–74 (2004) (finding that the primary goal of 
RLUIPA is to promote the “public health and safety” and that it is inappropriate for 
Congress to “regulate the manner in which states regulate those activities”); Gregory 
S. Walston, Federalism and Federal Spending: Why the Religious Land Use and In-
stitutionalized Persons Act of 2000 Is Unconstitutional, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 479, 481 
(2001) (arguing that RLUIPA is a “significant and undue intrusion into the authority 
of the judiciary and the states in violation of fundamental notions of separation of 
powers and federalism”); Lara A. Berwanger, Note, White Knight?: Can the Com-
merce Clause Save the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act?, 72 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2355, 2399 (2004) (explaining that by “enacting RLUIPA, Con-
gress encroached upon territory that states had traditionally regulated—local zoning 
laws”); Ada-Marie Walsh, Note, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act of 2000: Unconstitutional and Unnecessary, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 189, 
201 (2001) (explaining that RLUIPA violates the separation of powers and “com-
mandeers state and local governments to enforce federal legislation” as land use is a 
power that is traditionally left to state and local governments). 
 13. See supra text accompanying note 4. 
 14. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 
384–85 (1990) (“Our cases have established that ‘[t]he free exercise inquiry asks 
whether government has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central 
religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest jus-
tifies the burden.’” (quoting Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989)).  
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RLUIPA legislative history states that the term was intended to hold 
the same meaning under RLUIPA as it does under the Free Exercise 
Clause. 
The Act does not include a definition of the term “substantial bur-
den” because it is not the intent of this Act to create a new standard 
for the definition of “substantial burden” on religious exercise.  In-
stead, that term as used in the Act should be interpreted by refer-
ence to Supreme Court jurisprudence. . . . The term “substantial 
burden” as used in this Act is not intended to be given any broader 
interpretation than the Supreme Court’s articulation of the concept 
of substantial burden or religious exercise.15 
Before the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)16 and 
RLUIPA, the vast majority of courts concluded that the religious 
claimant could not prove a “substantial burden” merely by showing 
inconvenience or increased expense flowing from a government regu-
lation or law.  Since these two statutes have been inserted into free 
exercise doctrine, however, there has been a significant increase in 
the number of cases where courts have found a “substantial burden” 
based on mere inconvenience and cost.  The thesis of this Article is 
that this interpretation of “substantial burden” is unconstitutional. 
I.  THE PRE-EXISTING CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR 
LANDOWNERS IN THE LAND USE PROCESS, AND THE MOVEMENT 
UNDER RLUIPA TOWARD MAKING COST AND CONVENIENCE 
SUFFICIENT TO AVOID LOCAL LAND USE LAWS 
Land developers facing barriers in the land use process have had 
several theories on which to rely, including due process.  Religious 
landowners also have been able to rely upon the First Amendment.  
The record behind RLUIPA ignored due process and misleadingly 
downplayed the First Amendment.17  RLUIPA’s proponents have 
 
RLUIPA states that “the government shall bear the burden of persuasion on any el-
ement of the claim, except that the plaintiff shall bear the burden of persuasion on 
whether the law (including a regulation) or government practice that is challenged by 
the claim substantially burdens the plaintiff’s exercise of religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 
2000cc-2(b) (2006). 
 15. 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of 
Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy). 
 16. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
2000bb et seq. (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 17. See, e.g., Roman P. Storzer & Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., The Religious Land 
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: A Constitutional Response to Uncon-
stitutional Zoning Practices, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 929, 931 (2001) (“The lower 
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engaged in hyperbole while ignoring the availability of state and fed-
eral arguments against arbitrary or irrational decisionmaking in the 
land use context. 
The focus of this Article is on the prerequisite to free exercise 
claims in both the constitutional and statutory arena: whether the law 
imposes a “substantial burden” on the believer or organization.18  A 
de minimis19 or incidental burden20 is insufficient to trigger free exer-
cise protection. In numerous land use cases, the defense against appli-
cation of land use laws is that it would result in inconvenience or cost.  
This defense has been rejected in the due process cases, while there is 
a split in authority in the free exercise cases. 
A. Due Process for All Land Developers: Inconvenience and 
Cost Are Insufficient to Overcome Land Use Law 
Religious landowners, like all other landowners, can invoke due 
process when they face barriers from local land use decision-makers.  
No landowner has carte blanche to shape the land use plan or law to 
their private ends, but governments may not act arbitrarily under 
state law21 or under federal due process cases.22  Courts have been 
cautious in interfering with local zoning decisions unless the locality’s 
action “has no foundation in reason and is a mere arbitrary or irra-
tional exercise of power having no substantial relation to the public 
health, the public morals, the public safety or the public welfare.”23 If 
 
courts’ application of First Amendment principles have left churches vulnerable to 
even the most irrational zoning regulations.”). 
 18. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S. at 384–
85. 
 19. See Shakur v. Selsky, 391 F.3d 106, 120 (2d Cir. 2004); Rapier v. Harris, 172 
F.3d 999, 1006 n.4 (7th Cir. 1999); Walsh v. Louisiana High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 616 
F.2d 152, 158 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 20. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 
(1990); Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 649 (10th 
Cir. 2006); Islamic Ctr. of Miss., Inc. v. City of Starkville, 840 F.2d 293, 299 (5th Cir. 
1988). 
 21. See Budget Inn of Daphne, Inc. v. City of Daphne, 789 So.2d 154, 159 (Ala. 
2000); Town of Orangetown v. Magee, 88 N.Y.2d 41, 53 (N.Y. 1996); C & M Devel-
opers, Inc. v. Bedminster Twp. Zoning Bd., 820 A.2d 143, 150–51 (Pa. 2002); 
Schuback v. Silver, 336 A.2d 328, 335 (Pa. 1975). 
 22. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); Vill. of Arlington 
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263 (1977); Vill. of Euclid v. Am-
bler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d 
1369, 1373 (11th Cir. 1993). 
 23. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187–88 (1928); see also Euclid, 
272 U.S. at 395. 
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the landowner can establish a protected interest in property,24 he can 
challenge a denial if it is arbitrary and capricious,25 fails rational basis 
review,26 if there is significant animus,27 or if it shocks the con-
science.28 
 
 24. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985) (“Property 
interests are not created by the Constitution, ‘they are created and their dimensions 
are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source 
such as state law.’” (citation omitted)); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (holding 
that nonresidents had no standing to challenge the town’s exclusionary zoning); Pater 
v. City of Casper, 646 F.3d 1290, 1293–94 (10th Cir. 2011); Kuster v. Foley, 438 F. 
App’x 543, 545 (9th Cir. 2011); Conde v. Town of Sharon, 421 F. App’x 26, 27 (2d Cir. 
2011); White Oak Prop. Dev., LLC v. Washington Twp., 606 F.3d 842, 853, 854 (6th 
Cir. 2010); Horne v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 349 F. App’x 835, 838 (4th Cir. 
2009); R.S.W.W., Inc. v. City of Keego Harbor, 397 F.3d 427, 435 (6th Cir. 
2005) (“[T]o have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more 
than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expecta-
tion of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” (citing Bd. of 
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972))); Thomas v. Cohen, 304 F.3d 563, 576 (6th 
Cir. 2002); Tri-Corp Mgmt. Co. v. Praznik, 33 F. App’x 742, 747 (6th Cir. 
2002) (citing Silver v. Franklin Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 966 F.2d 1031, 1036 (6th 
Cir. 1992)); Hyde Park Co. v. Santa Fe City Council, 226 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir. 
2000); Circa Ltd. v. City of Miami, 79 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 
1996); Wedges/Ledges of Cal., Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 24 F.3d 56, 62 (9th Cir. 
1994); Kim Constr. Co., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Mundelein, 14 F.3d 1243, 1245 (7th Cir. 
1994); Patterson v. Omnipoint Commc’ns, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 222, 229 (D. Mass. 
2000) (finding an aesthetically pleasing view does not constitute a protectable proper-
ty interest); Burnham v. City of Salem, 101 F. Supp. 2d 26, 33 (D. Mass. 2000); Dubuc 
v. Green Oak Twp., 642 F. Supp. 2d 694, 700 (E.D. Mich. 2009); DC3, LLC v. Town 
of Geneva, 783 F. Supp. 2d 418, 421 (W.D.N.Y. 2011); Bletter v. Inc. Vill. of 
Westhampton Beach, 88 F. Supp. 2d 21, 25 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Scott v. City of Seat-
tle, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1267 (W.D. Wash. 1999). 
 25. See, e.g., Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395 (holding zoning regulations will survive a 
substantive due process challenge unless they are “clearly arbitrary and unreasona-
ble, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general wel-
fare”). 
 26. See Nectow, 277 U.S. at 187–88 (stating that courts should not interfere with 
local zoning decisions unless the locality’s action “has no foundation in reason and is 
a mere arbitrary or irrational exercise of power having no substantial relation to the 
public health, the public morals, the public safety or the public welfare”); Euclid, 272 
U.S. at 395 (finding that zoning regulations will survive substantive due process chal-
lenge unless they are “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial rela-
tion to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare”); Smithfield Concerned 
Citizens for Fair Zoning v. Town of Smithfield, 907 F.2d 239, 244 (1st Cir. 1990) (“In 
adjudicating substantive due process challenges to zoning ordinances, a court asks 
only whether a conceivable rational relationship exists between the zoning ordinance 
and legitimate governmental ends.”); Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass’n. v. Simi Valley, 882 
F.2d 1398, 1407 (9th Cir. 1989) (“To establish a violation of substantive due process, 
the plaintiffs must prove that the government’s action was clearly arbitrary and un-
reasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or gen-
eral welfare.” (internal quotation omitted)); Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256, 258 
(11th Cir. 1989) (A deprivation of a property interest is said to be of constitutional 
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magnitude if it is undertaken “for an improper motive and by means that were 
pretextual, arbitrary and capricious, and . . . without any rational basis”); La Salle 
Nat’l. Bank of Chi. v. Cnty. of Cook, 145 N.E.2d 65, 69 (Ill. 1957) (highlighting the 
following factors in determining whether zoning laws are arbitrary and capricious: (1) 
the character of the area where the restricted property is located, including existing 
uses and zoning of nearby property; (2) the extent to which property values are di-
minished by the challenged regulation; (3) the purpose of the regulation, and the ex-
tent to which the destruction of private property values promotes the public health, 
safety and general welfare; (4) the balancing of public and private interests (i.e. the 
relative gain to the public as compared to the hardship imposed upon the individual 
property owner); (5) the suitability of the property for the permitted purposes; (6) 
the length of time that the property has been vacant as zoned considered in the con-
text of land development in the vicinity of the subject property; (7) whether there ex-
ists a comprehensive plan; (8) whether the challenged regulation is in harmony with 
the comprehensive plan; and (9) whether the community needs the proposed use); 
ACCO Unlimited Corp. v. City of Johnston, 611 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 2000) 
(“When the right infringed is not fundamental, substantive due process demands no 
more than ‘a ‘reasonable fit’ between government purpose . . . and the means chosen 
to advance that purpose.’” (quoting In re C.S., 516 N.W.2d 851, 861 (Iowa 1994))); 
Robinson v. City of Seattle 830 P.2d 318 (Wash. 1992) (finding generally, landowner 
must show facts evidencing totally irrational or egregious conduct on part of zoning 
officials in applying particular land use regulation to owner’s property). 
 27. See Mikels Motors, Inc. v. Twp. Of Stroud, 48 F. App’x 844, 846 (3d Cir. 
2002); Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir. 1998); 
Tri Cnty. Indus., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 104 F.3d 455, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (find-
ing “grave unfairness,” as a result of “substantial infringement of state law prompted 
by personal or group animus, or a deliberate flouting of the law that tramples signifi-
cant personal or property rights” violates due process); Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. 
City of Phila., 945 F.2d 667, 683 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding a due process violation when 
government actions are motivated by “bias, bad faith, improper motive, racial ani-
mus, or the existence of partisan political or personal reasons”); Silverman v. Bar-
ry, 845 F.2d 1072, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Rymer v. Douglas Cnty., 764 F.2d 796, 801 
(11th Cir. 1985); Dominion Cogen, D.C., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 878 F. Supp. 
258, 264 (D.D.C. 1995); Moore v. City of Tallahassee, 928 F. Supp. 1140, 1145 (N.D. 
Fla. 1995); L.C. Dev. Co., Inc. v. Lincoln Cnty., 996 F. Supp. 886, 888 (E.D. Mo. 
1990); John E. Long, Inc. v. Borough of Ringwood, 61 F. Supp. 2d 273, 284 (D.N.J. 
1998) (finding that “discourteous, rude, and abrasive” comments and actions are not 
enough to constitute a substantive due process violation); Omnipoint Commc’ns. En-
ter. v. Zoning Bd. of Easttown Twp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 512 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (finding that 
the failure to base a decision on substantial evidence is not enough to state a substan-
tive due process violation); Omnipoint Commc’ns., Inc. v. Foster Twp., 46 F. Supp. 2d 
396, 410 (M.D. Pa. 1999); see also Steven J. Eagle, Property Tests, Due Process Tests 
and Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 2007 BYU L. REV. 899, 949 (2007) (“With 
respect to the denial of land development approval, substantive due process con-
strains only ‘grave unfairness,’ such as ‘a substantial infringement of state law 
prompted by personal or group animus, or [2] a deliberate flouting of the law that 
trammels significant personal or property rights . . . .’” (quoting George Washington 
Univ. v. District of Columbia, 318 F.3d 203, 209 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). 
 28. See Baker v. Coxe, 230 F.3d 470, 474 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding that “abuse of 
power that shocks the conscience, or action that is legally irrational” violates substan-
tive due process); Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Twp. of W. Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 184 
(3d Cir. 1999) (finding that “‘only the most egregious official conduct can be said to 
be arbitrary in the constitutional sense.’ To generate liability, executive action must 
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As one might expect, land developers have bristled at the inevita-
ble delays and costs of the land use process, which routinely requires 
applications, studies to justify circumventing land use requirements, 
application fees, and public hearings.29  In addition, the land use plan, 
which takes into account multiple interests and values in the commu-
nity, may well decrease property values, disappoint expectations 
about re-zoning, or impose requirements that keep the property from 
achieving its highest valuable use.  Thus, there has been a line of cases 
addressing the argument that local governments may not impose in-
 
be so ill-conceived or malicious that it ‘shocks the conscience.’”); Licari v. Ferruzzi, 
22 F.3d 344, 347 (1st Cir. 1994) (“A viable substantive due process claim requires 
proof that the state action was ‘in and of itself . . . egregiously unacceptable, outra-
geous, or conscience-shocking.’” (internal citation omitted)); Harris v. City of Akron, 
20 F.3d 1396, 1405 (6th Cir. 1994); Nestor Colon Medina & Sucesores, Inc. v. 
Custodio, 964 F.2d 32, 45 (1st Cir. 1992) (finding federal relief is available only “in 
truly horrendous situations”); G.M. Eng’rs & Assocs., Inc. v. W. Bloomfield Twp., 
922 F.2d 328, 332 (6th Cir. 1990); McDonald’s Corp. v. City of Norton Shores, 102 F. 
Supp. 2d 431, 437 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (finding that an action shocks the judicial con-
science if is an “irrational decision or one directed toward illegitimate objectives”); 
Burnham v. City of Salem, 101 F. Supp. 2d 26, 37 (D. Mass. 1999); Brooks v. Sauceda, 
85 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1125 (D. Kan. 2000); Scott v. City of Seattle, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 
1270 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (To establish a violation of substantive due process, the 
plaintiffs must show that the City deprived their liberty or property interests in such a 
way that “shocks the conscience” or “interferes with rights implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty.”); Watson v. City of Kansas City, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1189 (D. Kan. 
1999); Welch v. Paicos, 66 F. Supp. 2d 138, 166 (D. Mass. 1999) (“In the rough-and-
tumble politics of land use planning, very little can shock the constitutional con-
science.”); Leisure Time Cruise Corp. v. Town of Barnstable, 62 F. Supp. 2d 202, 209 
(D. Mass. 1999); Keys Youth Servs., Inc. v. City of Olathe, 38 F. Supp. 2d 914, 926 (D. 
Kan. 1999) (“[A] degree of outrageousness and a magnitude of potential or actual 
harm that is truly conscience shocking.”); Equus Assocs. Ltd v. Town of Southamp-
ton, 975 F. Supp. 454, 459 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that substantive due process pro-
tects against behavior which is “arbitrary, conscience shocking, or oppressive in a 
constitutional sense, but not against action that is ‘incorrect or ill-advised.”’); see also 
Eagle, supra note 27, at 956, n.347 (noting that “many circuits have adopted the 
‘shocks the conscience’ standard,” and citing Torromeo v. Town of Fremont, 438 F.3d 
113, 118 (1st Cir. 2006) (“We recently explained the limits on substantive due process 
claims arising from land-use disputes: . . .  ‘[S]ubstantive due process prevents gov-
ernmental power from being used for purposes of oppression, or abuse of govern-
ment power that shocks the conscience . . . .’” (quoting SFW Arecibo Ltd. v. 
Rodríguez, 415 F.3d 135, 141 (1st Cir. 2005)))). 
 29. See Pamina Ewing, Note, Impact Fees in Pennsylvania: Requiring Land De-
velopers to Bear Development-Related Costs, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 1101, 1102 (1989) 
(discussing how impact fees have shifted “development-related costs from taxpayers 
to developers and new residents”); Carolyn W. Poulin, Comment, Land Use Applica-
tions Not Acted upon Shall Be Deemed Approved: A Weighing of the Interests, 57 
UMKC L. REV. 607, 613 (1989) (discussing how the ad hoc imposition of require-
ments by approving agencies can cause costly delays for the developer). See generally 
Orlando E. Delogu, The Misuse of Land Use Control Powers Must End: Suggestions 
for Legislative and Judicial Responses, 32 ME. L. REV. 29 (1980). 
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convenience or expense on developers without reference to the de-
velopers’ identity. 
In these cases, inconvenience and expense arguments have been in-
sufficient for landowners seeking to overturn negative zoning or land 
use decisions.  All landowners object to decreased property values 
and to barriers to achieving the highest and most valuable use of a 
piece of property, but these objections do not establish a due process 
violation.30 
 
 30. See Braun v. Ann Arbor Charter Twp., 519 F.3d 564, 567 (6th Cir. 
2008) (finding no constitutional violation where rezoning petition for future use of 
agriculturally zoned property for residential purposes was denied, though plaintiffs 
argued that only residential housing would be economically viable); Mongeau v. City 
of Marlborough, 492 F.3d 14, 15 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that city official’s insistence 
on mitigation payment for issuance of building permit did not run afoul if the consti-
tution); 360 Degrees Comm. Co. of Charlottesville v. Board of Sup’rs of Albemarle 
Cnty., 211 F.3d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding no unconstitutional prohibition where 
wireless telecommunications services provider was required to build communications 
tower on particular site at costs far above the industry-wide norm); Rogin v. Ben-
salem Twp., 616 F.2d 680, 682 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that no constitutional violation 
existed where zoning amendments reduced permissible population density in district, 
thereby causing delay in construction of condominium project); Ybarra v. Town of 
Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250, 254 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that city was not required 
to show compelling interest to justify large-lot zoning ordinance, even if ordinance 
created difficulty for poor populations to access work and social services); American 
Univ. v. Prentiss, 113 F.Supp. 389, 392–93 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (striking down a zoning 
application submitted by a group of neighbors who argued that construction of a hos-
pital would result in a serious invasion of privacy, create traffic congestion, generate 
noises, and impair property values, on the basis that such rezoning would not further 
the general welfare of the community); Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc. v S. Coast Reg’l 
Comm., 553 P.2d 546, 553 (Cal. 1976) (finding that developer had no vested right to 
build further, despite having incurred liabilities of $740,000, because developer never 
applied for building permit before change in zoning became effective); Comm. for 
Reasonable Regulation of Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 311 F. Supp. 
2d 972, 994 (D. Nev. 2004) (holding that scenic review ordinance did not violate Con-
stitution, even though property owners asserted that enforcement of ordinance would 
result in $100 million in lost property value and interfere with their investment-
backed expectations); Rumpke Waste, Inc. v. Henderson, 591 F. Supp. 521, 533 (S.D. 
Ohio 1984) (finding no constitutional violation where zoning law precluding devel-
opment of landfill on property of religious Protestants, even though landowners had 
been attempting to sell property for at least ten years prior to purchase offer by pro-
posed sanitary landfill developer, and where land would have had higher value if 
landfill could be developed); Omnipoint Commc’ns. Enter., L.P. v. Warrington Twp., 
63 F. Supp. 2d 658, 662 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (finding that Township’s insistence that appli-
cant disguise communication tower as tree did not violate Telecommunications Act’s 
proscription against local zoning authorities’ prohibition of personal wireless services, 
even though it added an estimated $150,000 to cost of tower estimated at between 
$134,000 and $444,000); Sun Oil Co. v. Clifton, 84 A.2d 555, 557 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
1951) (finding no vested right for gas company to obtain service station permit for 
filling station, despite gas company’s incurrence of expenses in cutting curbs and in-
stalling gas tanks); Champion Builders v. City of Terrell Hills, 70 S.W.3d 221, 224 
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B. Free Exercise for Religious Landowners: There Is a Split in 
Authority Regarding Whether Inconvenience and Expense are 
Sufficient to Prove a Substantial Burden on Religious Exercise 
The legislative history of RLUIPA tells courts to interpret “sub-
stantial burden” as it was interpreted under the First Amendment.31  
Most Free Exercise Clause decisions rejected inconvenience or ex-
pense as sufficient to prove a substantial burden.  The RLUIPA deci-
sions, however, have departed from the earlier doctrine by permitting 
inconvenience and expense to be sufficient in a number of cases to 
prove substantial burden.  There is now a split in authority across 
many courts. 
1. Under the First Amendment, Inconvenience and Expense Have 
Been Insufficient to Prove a Substantial Burden on Religious 
Exercise in Land Use Cases 
At the time that RLUIPA was enacted in 2000, the vast majority of 
First Amendment-based free exercise cases had held that cost and/or 
inconvenience are insufficient to prove substantial burden.  In that 
era, courts deciding land use cases routinely held that a religious 
claimant could not prove the threshold requirement of a free exercise 
claim⎯that the government had imposed a “substantial burden” on 
the free exercise of religion⎯simply on evidence that the land use 
process imposed either cost or inconvenience.32  For example, in 
 
(Tex. App. Ct. 2001) (finding no constitutional violation where zoning ordinance in-
creased minimum square footage requirements for single-family apartment units 
from 800 to 1200, and finding further that constitutional violation only occurred 
where ordinance actually denied all economically viable use of property). 
 31. See supra text accompanying note 15.  
 32. See, e.g., Rector, Wardens, & Members of Vestry of St. Bartholomew’s 
Church v. The City of N.Y., 914 F.2d 348, 355 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding landmarks law 
constitutional despite restriction on Church’s ability to raise revenues and noting “we 
understand Supreme Court decisions to indicate that neutral regulations that dimin-
ish the income of a religious organization do not implicate the free exercise clause”); 
Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. City and Cnty. of S.F., 896 F.2d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir. 
1990) (finding zoning ordinance forbidding church to build in residential neighbor-
hood did not create substantial burden, but only created “minimal” burden relating 
to convenience and expense); Messiah Baptist Church v. Cnty. of Jefferson, 859 F.2d 
820, 825 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding no free exercise violation where zoning regulation 
merely added expense to the practice of religion); Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 
F.2d 729, 739 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding no burden on free exercise where law only in-
directly affects religious practice, or where law has secular purpose); Lakewood, 
Ohio Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 
306 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding religious exercise was not unduly burdened just because 
zoning laws forced church to build on more expensive land, and holding that “incon-
venient economic burdens on religious freedom do not rise to a constitutionally im-
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Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 
the Ninth Circuit held that the denial of a conditional use permit to 
establish a house of worship only amounted to a “burden[] . . . of con-
venience and expense.”33  While the church emphasized its desire to 
practice “home worship,” the denial only prevented home worship in 
a particular location.34  The burden only required the church to find 
another home or venue for worship.35 
Another pre-RFRA case, Messiah Baptist Church v. County of Jef-
ferson,36 involved an agricultural regulation that prohibited churches 
within the A-2 zone.  The plaintiffs’ free exercise challenge failed, as 
the neutral regulation merely added expense to the practice of reli-
gion and thus did not substantially affect a liberty interest because the 
economic burden was incidental.37  The Tenth Circuit found that the 
regulation only implicated property interests and had a substantial re-
lationship to the general welfare of county residents.38 Therefore, the 
prohibition was constitutional.39  Similarly, the Sixth Circuit found 
 
permissible infringement of free exercise”); Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 
655 P.2d 1293, 1297, 1302 (Alaska 1982) (finding that mere inconvenience and greater 
expense of complying with the zoning regulations as related to the location of a paro-
chial school is not enough to force a locality to bend its regulations in favor of the 
church); Abram v. City of Fayetteville, 661 S.W.2d 371, 373 (Ark. 1983) (finding that 
the inconvenience or economic burden was caused by the church’s failure to comply 
with valid zoning regulations); Bd. of Zoning v. Decatur Ind. Co. of Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses, 117 N.E.2d 115, 118, 121 (Ind. 1954) (holding that zoning ordinance regarding 
property setbacks lines did not violate church’s free exercise, but that enforcement of 
off-street parking restriction would infringe upon right to freedom of worship and 
assembly); Hope Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 463 
N.W.2d 76, 82 (Iowa 1990) (holding that payment of generally-applicable consumer 
tax imposed no unconstitutional burden on Hope’s sincere religious beliefs because 
the law merely decreases the amount of money a taxpayer has to spend on its reli-
gious activities); State ex rel. O’Sullivan v. Heart Ministries, Inc., 607 P.2d 1102, 1112 
(Kan. 1980) (“The compelling interest of the State, as parens patriae, is the protec-
tion of its children… [to] these requirements the defendants’ free exercise rights must 
bow; the balance weighs heavily in favor of those unfortunate children whom the 
State must protect”). See generally San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 
360 F. 3d 1024, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding no substantial burden under 
RLUIPA because other options for building were available to religious group as in-
terference must be more than mere inconvenience); Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa 
Temple v. Sullivan, 953 P.2d 1315, 1346 (Haw. 1998) (finding that mere expense and 
inconvenience are not enough to constitute a substantial burden). 
 33. Christian Gospel Church, 896 F.2d at 1224. 
 34. See id.  
 35. See id. 
 36. 859 F.2d 820 (10th Cir. 1988). 
 37. See id. at 825. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See id. 
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that a city’s refusal to grant a zoning exception to the Congregation of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses did not infringe upon its freedom of religion.40  
While the denial required the Congregation to build in a more expen-
sive location where such buildings complied with zoning require-
ments, “the First Amendment does not require the City to make all 
land or even the cheapest or most beautiful land available to its 
churches.”41 
Likewise, in the single case involving religious practices and re-
strictions on the land that the Supreme Court decided in 1988—
before RFRA and RLUIPA—the Court explicitly stated that even a 
severe incidental burden may not establish a substantial burden on 
the free exercise of religion.42  In that case, the Court declined to halt 
development on federal lands despite the location of burial grounds 
sacred to the plaintiff on the property.43 
The Supreme Court’s free exercise cases not involving land also 
have followed the principle that cost and inconvenience are insuffi-
cient to establish a “substantial burden” for purposes of the Free Ex-
ercise Clause.44  “At bottom, though we do not doubt the economic 
cost to appellant of complying with a generally applicable sales and 
use tax, such a tax is no different from other generally applicable laws 
 
 40. Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lake-
wood, 699 F.2d 303, 307 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Lyng v. N.W. Indian Cemetery Protect. Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451–52 (1988) 
(rejecting a free exercise claim to halt development of federal lands on land consid-
ered sacred even where the burden may be “extremely grave”). 
 43. Id. at 447. 
 44. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997); Jimmy Swaggart Minis-
tries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 389–90 (1990) (holding a general tax 
which does not condition the receipt of a benefit on behavior proscribed by religious 
faith was not an unconstitutional burden on free exercise); Hernandez v. Comm’r, 
490 U.S. 680, 689 (1989) (finding tax law that created separate code for charitable de-
ductions did not violate free exercise because “[the fact] that the taxpayers would 
‘have less money to pay to the Church, or that the Church [would] receive less mon-
ey, [did] not rise to the level of a burden on appellants’ ability to exercise their reli-
gious beliefs’” (citations omitted)); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986) (finding 
that the nature of a burden is relevant to the standard government must meet to justi-
fy the burden, and holding that forcing welfare applicants to make choices does not 
affirmatively compel action counter to religious tenets); Bob Jones Univ. v. United 
States, 461 U.S. 574, 603–04 (1983) (holding not all burdens on religion are unconsti-
tutional and some may be justified by an overriding governmental interest, and find-
ing that the interest in eradication of racial discrimination in education substantially 
outweighs the financial burden of denying tax benefits); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 
599, 605–06 (1961) (holding that the Sunday closing law serves a compelling state in-
terest and is not an unconstitutional burden on free exercise, despite economic con-
sequences for Orthodox Jewish business owners). 
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and regulations—such as health and safety regulations—to which ap-
pellant must adhere.”45 
A split in authority in land use cases was developing, however, with 
a small number of lower courts holding that cost and/or inconven-
ience could be sufficient to establish a substantial burden.46  For in-
stance, in Islamic Center of Mississippi v. City of Starkville, the Fifth 
Circuit found that the City’s zoning law, which required a mosque to 
be built in a location only accessible by automobile and expensive for 
all observers to get to, constituted a substantial burden on free exer-
cise.47  The court also noted, however, that incidental economic bur-
dens where there is an alternative opportunity for religious conduct 
would not qualify as an undue burden on free exercise.48 
In another land use decision, Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue 
of the North Shore, Inc. v. Village of Roslyn Harbor, the New York 
Court of Appeals declared unconstitutional a village zoning ordi-
nance that required all religious buildings located in residential areas 
to be set back at least one hundred feet because the cost of moving 
plaintiff’s synagogue or constructing new facilities was so great that it 
would be tantamount to a denial of the use permit.49  Similarly, in 
Munns v. Martin, the Supreme Court of Washington held that a dem-
olition permit ordinance, which had the potential to cause a fourteen-
month delay in a Catholic bishop’s plans to demolish a school build-
 
 45. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S. at 391. 
 46. See Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Pentecostal House of Prayer, Inc., 380 
N.E.2d 1225, 1228 (Ind. 1978) (holding a photo identification requirement for a driv-
er’s license is an unconstitutional infringement on church members’ religious beliefs 
because the state can ensure driver competency and public safety through less intru-
sive means); Blount v. Dep’t of Educ. & Cultural Servs., 551 A.2d 1377, 1380 (Me. 
1988) (finding that the state approval process for homeschooling places a substantial 
burden on free exercise where the individuals believe that such process would be “an 
act of apostasy”); Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue of the North Shore, Inc. v. 
Vill. of Roslyn Harbor, 342 N.E.2d 534, 540 (N.Y. 1975) (holding a zoning ordinance 
which regulates religious organizations but does not leave room for adaptations is 
unconstitutional when applied to a synagogue where the cost of building a new facili-
ty is tantamount to denial of permit); Stajkowski v. Carbon Cnty. Bd. of Assessment 
& Revision of Taxes, 541 A.2d 1384, 1386–87 (Pa. 1988) (holding that an occupation 
tax imposed on a Roman Catholic priest places an impermissible burden on the free 
exercise of religion); Munns v. Martin, 930 P.2d 318, 324–25 (Wash. 1997) (holding 
that a potential delay created an unconstitutional burden since the delay created ad-
ditional costs and the only purpose of the delay was to allow opponents to the vari-
ance to come forward). 
 47. 840 F.2d 293, 302 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 48. See id. 
 49. 342 N.E.2d at 540. 
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ing and construct a pastoral center, violated the church’s right of free 
exercise of religion as guaranteed by the state’s constitution.50 
It is accurate to say, in the end, that the vast majority of First 
Amendment land use cases have held that inconvenience and expense 
are insufficient to meet the plaintiff’s burden of proving a substantial 
burden on religious exercise.51  RLUIPA changed that. 
2. After RLUIPA, More Courts Have Held That Inconvenience 
and Expense Are Sufficient Proof of Substantial Burden in Land Use 
Cases 
After RLUIPA was injected into the free exercise mix, the small 
split in authority over the use of cost and convenience in free exercise 
land use cases became more pronounced.  At this point, it is difficult 
for local governments to be certain of their liabilities and obligations 
with respect to religious applicants in land use cases because of the 
split on the sufficiency of cost and/or inconvenience to trigger free 
exercise protection under RLUIPA.  Indeed, in circuits where the is-
sue has arisen repeatedly, there are even intra-circuit splits.52 
 
 50. 930 P.2d at 325. 
 51. A few cases outside of land use also held that cost and/or inconvenience could 
be sufficient to establish a substantial burden.  For example, in Pentecostal House of 
Prayer, Inc., 380 N.E.2d at 1229, the Supreme Court of Indiana found that a statute 
requiring driver’s licenses to bear a photograph of the licensee was unconstitutional 
as applied to members of the Pentecostal church whose religious beliefs prohibit 
them from owning, posing for or otherwise participating in any form of photography.  
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania also found that costs associated with a county 
occupation tax violated priests’ First Amendment rights in Stajkowski, 541 A.2d at 
1387. 
 52. Compare Int’l Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 634 
F.3d 1037, 1046 (9th Cir. 2011) (paying lip service to the principle against finding sub-
stantial burden based on inconvenience but finding the potential for substantial bur-
den where there were no properties currently on the market available to the church), 
with San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F. 3d 1024, 1031–32 (9th Cir. 
2004) (finding no substantial burden under RLUIPA because other options for build-
ing were available to the religious group and the burden must be more than mere in-
convenience), and Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 
978, 988–89 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that laws must place more than a mere inconven-
ience on free exercise to constitute substantial burden). Compare Petra Presbyterian 
Church v. Vill. of Northbrook, 489 F.3d 846, 851–52 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding no sub-
stantial burden where other land was available), and Vision Church, United Method-
ist v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 993–94 (7th Cir. 2006) (rejecting inconven-
ience as a factor to prove substantial burden), with Sts. Constantine & Helen Greek 
Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895, 901 (7th Cir. 2005) (find-
ing a substantial burden where zoning laws would have required a church to look for 
other land and the process could cause delay, uncertainty, and expense). 
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Many decisions have followed the dominant doctrine established 
under the First Amendment and have held that cost and inconven-
ience are not sufficient to prove substantial burden in the land use 
context.53  These courts delimited their interpretation of  “substantial 
 
 53. See World Outreach Conference Ctr. v. City of Chi., 591 F.3d 531, 539 (7th 
Cir. 2009) (finding the designation of a building as a historic landmark was not a sub-
stantial burden, despite the church’s complaints of lost rents and lack of economic 
viability for residential use); Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1063 
(9th Cir. 2008) (finding that purely subjective burdens such as spiritual feelings and 
inconveniences cannot be deemed substantial); Petra Presbyterian Church, 489 F.3d 
at 851 (finding a zoning ordinance preventing a church from building in an industrial 
zone did not amount to a substantial burden under RLUIPA because there was other 
land the church could obtain; the further right to build is not a right, it is a privilege); 
Vision Church, 468 F.3d at 999 (finding the village’s zoning ordinance did not present 
a substantial burden to churches—despite construction restrictions, size and capacity 
limitations, and special use permits for construction of new churches—and holding 
that a law is not unconstitutional if the burden imposed is mere inconvenience); Guru 
Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Yuba City, 456 F.3d at 989 (finding a substantial burden under 
RLUIPA because the city’s rejection of observers church construction was inconsist-
ently determined and also made it very difficult for the church to potentially build in 
the future, but still averring that the law must place more than a mere inconvenience 
on free exercise to constitute a substantial burden); Grace United Methodist Church 
v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 661 (10th Cir. 2006) (interpreting substantial bur-
den by reference to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)); 
Konikov v. Orange Cnty., 410 F.3d 1317, 1323–24 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding no sub-
stantial burden under RLUIPA where zoning laws required a Rabbi to apply to the 
zoning board for an ordinance because this did not prohibit his religious activity); 
Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1228 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(finding no substantial burden under RLUIPA where synagogues were excluded 
from being built in the business district because the burden has to be more than in-
convenience or incidental effect); Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 
342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding scarcity of affordable land for development, 
costs, procedural requirements, and inherent political aspects of zoning processes did 
not give rise to a substantial burden under RLUIPA); San Jose Christian Coll., 360 
F.3d at 1035–36 (finding no substantial burden under RLUIPA because other options 
for building were available to the religious group and interference must be more than 
mere inconvenience); Church of Scientology of Georgia v. City of Sandy Springs, No. 
1:10-CV-00082-AT, 2012 WL 500263, at *19–21 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 10, 2012) (explaining 
that no substantial burden exists “where the government action may make religious 
exercise more expensive or difficult but does not place substantial pressure on a reli-
gious institution to violate or forego its religious beliefs and does not effectively bar a 
religious institution from using its property in the exercise of its religion”); Calvary 
Christian Ctr. v. City of Fredericksburg, 800 F. Supp. 2d 760, 774 (E.D. Va. 2011); 
Wesleyan Methodist Church of Canisteo v. Vill. of Canisteo, 792 F. Supp. 2d 667, 
673–74 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that expenditure of funds, delay and expense do 
not constitute substantial burden where the plaintiff did not purchase the property 
and knew all along that the city zoning code did not permit churches in the light in-
dustrial zone); Roman Catholic Bishop v. City of Springfield, 760 F. Supp. 2d 172, 188 
(D. Mass. 2011) (finding no RLUIPA violation because the requirement that plaintiff 
submit an application for a certificate of appropriateness, non-applicability, or hard-
ship to the city historical commission before altering church’s external architectural 
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burden” to a regulation that either prevents the religious adherent’s 
“engaging in conduct or having a religious experience which the faith 
mandates” or compels the individual to engage in behavior his faith 
eschews at all times; “[t]his interference must be more than an incon-
venience.”54  In World Outreach Conference Center v. City of Chica-
go, the Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church sought to demolish its 
current building, which had been previously designated a landmark 
under the city’s preservation ordinance, in order to build a new Fami-
ly Life Center.55  The Seventh Circuit held the city’s refusal to allow 
the church to demolish the building was at most a modest burden on 
the church because it did not prevent them from selling the building 
 
features did not impose a substantial burden on free exercise); W. Presbyterian 
Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F. Supp. 538, 544–47 (D.D.C. 1994) (dis-
cussing substantial burden under RFRA and holding that the operation of a feed-the-
homeless program at a church constituted protected religious activity triggering strict 
scrutiny); Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 874 P.2d 274, 283–84 (Alas-
ka 1994) (finding no substantial burden on free exercise where plaintiff landlord 
chose to enter into a commercial activity regulated by anti-discrimination laws); Ko-
rean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple v. Sullivan, 953 P.2d 1315, 1346 (Haw. 1998) 
(finding mere “expense and inconvenience” do not constitute substantial burden, es-
pecially where the religious group failed to amend plans on file before beginning con-
struction, thus making any burden likely self-inflicted); Trinity Assembly of God of 
Balt. City, Inc. v. People’s Counsel for Balt. Cnty., 962 A.2d 404, 428 (Md. 2008); 
Greater Bible Way Temple of Jackson v. City of Jackson, 733 N.W.2d 734, 748 (Mich. 
2007); State of Mont. v. King Colony Ranch, 350 P.2d 841, 843–44 (Mont. 1960) (find-
ing that non-discriminatory tax on commercial agricultural activities does not inter-
fere with free exercise of religion of commune members); Corp. of the Presiding 
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Sts. v. City of W. Linn, 111 P.3d 
1123, 1130 (Or. 2005) (finding that expenses associated with re-submitting an applica-
tion “do not constitute  substantial burden in and of themselves, nor does the re-
quirement of submitting the application”); Tran v. Gwinn, 554 S.E.2d 63, 66–67 (Va. 
2001) (finding that substantial burden must be more than minimal or incidental be-
cause the constitution tolerates financial costs associated with the permit process or 
relocation as that would not impact any religious belief or practice); City of Wood-
inville v. Northshore United Church of Christ, 211 P.3d 406, 411 (Wash. 2009) (find-
ing that a burden can be a slight inconvenience without violating free exercise, but 
holding that although feeding the homeless is not at the “core” of protected worship, 
a city’s moratorium on all land use permit applications placed a substantial burden on 
the church in violation of the church’s constitutional right to religious freedom under 
the Washington State Constitution, Article 1, which here provided greater protec-
tions than the U.S. Constitution); Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark Cnty., 995 P.2d 
33, 43–44, 46–48 (Wash. 2000) (finding that mere inability to pay for permit require-
ments does not rise to the level of a cognizable burden, and noting that burdens of 
convenience or expense are likely not substantial). 
 54. San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, No. C091-20857, 2001 WL 
1862224, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2001) (citation omitted), aff’d, 360 F.3d 1024 (9th 
Cir. 2004). 
 55. 591 F.3d at 538–39. 
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and using the proceeds to build a family life center elsewhere.56  In 
Vision Church v. Village of Long Grove, Vision Church claimed that 
the city’s building codes were a substantial burden under RLUIPA.57  
The court, however, held that “these conditions—which included lim-
itations on future development, on the use of a particular outdoor ar-
ea, and on Sunday and weekly activities—are no more than incidental 
burdens on the exercise of religion” and did not rise to the level of a 
substantial burden under RLUIPA.58  In Konikov v. Orange County, 
Florida, a rabbi claimed a local zoning ordinance that required appli-
cation for a special exception in order to operate a religious organiza-
tion was a substantial burden under RLUIPA.59  The Eleventh Circuit 
rejected the rabbi’s claim, holding that an “application for a special 
exception does not coerce conformity of a religious adherent’s behav-
ior” and “does not impose a substantial burden as defined by 
RLUIPA.”60 
Other decisions show that RLUIPA litigation has opened the door 
to the expansion of a right to avoid mere inconvenience and expense 
for religious developers.  In Saints Constantine and Helen Greek Or-
thodox Church v. City of New Berlin, Judge Richard Posner reversed 
the District Court’s finding of no discrimination61 and found that re-
quiring the church in question to search for other parcels of land or to 
continue to file applications with the city constituted a substantial 
burden as there would have been “delay, uncertainty, and expense.”62  
Additional courts have also held that mere cost and inconvenience in 
the land use context can be sufficient to prove substantial burden in 
RLUIPA cases.63 
In Cottonwood Christian Center v. Cypress Redevelopment Agen-
cy, the court held that the denial of a conditional use permit imposed 
a substantial burden on the church’s religious beliefs when it was pro-
hibited from building “a large and multi-faceted church” sufficient to 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. 468 F.3d at 998–99. 
 58. Id. 
 59. 410 F.3d at 1322. 
 60. Id. at 1323–24. 
 61. 396 F.3d 895, 901 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 62. Id. 
 63. See, e.g., Int’l Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 634 
F.3d 1037, 1046–47 (9th Cir. 2011); Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 
F.3d 338, 349 (2d Cir. 2007); DiLaura v. Twp. of Ann Arbor, 112 F. App’x 445, 446 
(6th Cir. 2004); Reaching Hearts Int’l, Inc. v. Prince George’s Cnty., 584 F. Supp. 2d 
766, 786 (D. Md. 2008), aff’d, 368 F. App’x 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2010); Barr v. City of 
Sinton, 295 S.W. 3d 287, 296–97, 300–05 (Tex. 2009). 
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permit its 4000 person congregation to meet in one service and to ac-
commodate its other programs.64  Similarly, relying on the Church’s 
realtor who testified that no other suitable properties existed, the 
Ninth Circuit in International Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. 
City of San Leandro found that “when the religious institution ‘ha[d] 
no ready alternatives, or where the alternatives require substantial 
‘delay, uncertainty, and expense,’ a complete denial of the [religious 
institution’s] application might be indicative of a substantial bur-
den.’”65  The theory that convenience or expense can constitute a sub-
stantial burden triggering free exercise protection was not novel in 
RLUIPA cases, as discussed above, but it has become more preva-
lent. 
Whether cost and/or inconvenience can be sufficient to prove a 
substantial burden in free exercise land use cases is an important issue 
for every city, town, village, municipality, county, state, and locality in 
the United States.  Cost and convenience are factors that affect every 
land use applicant, religious or not.  If cost and/or inconvenience are 
sufficient to trigger free exercise protection, local governments need 
to know.  But, more importantly, these criteria make RLUIPA plain-
ly unconstitutional. 
II.  PERMITTING RELIGIOUS LANDOWNERS TO AVOID LOCAL 
LAND USE LAWS BECAUSE THEY CAUSE EXPENSE OR 
INCONVENIENCE VIOLATES FEDERALISM AND THE 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
In another Article, The Constitutional Limitations on Congress’s 
Power Over Local Land Use, I established why RLUIPA’s section 
2(a), authorizing federal interference with local land use decision-
making, is unconstitutional—it violates the principles of federalism.66  
In this Article, I focus on an interpretation of one term in RLUIPA 
and the First Amendment—“substantial burden”—and argue that 
that this interpretation is unconstitutional.67 
 
 64. 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1227 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 65. 634 F.3d at 1046 (quoting Westchester Day Sch., 504 F.3d at 349) (citations 
omitted).  
 66. Constitutional Limitations on Congress’s Power Over Local Land Use, supra 
note 2, at 411–15.  
 67. It is not clear that the Supreme Court would uphold the land use provision of 
RLUIPA.  Justice Thomas, concurring in Cutter v. Wilkinson, wrote that RLUIPA 
“may well exceed Congress’ authority under either the Spending Clause or the 
Commerce Clause.” 544 U.S. 709, 727 n.2 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also 
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A. The Criteria of Inconvenience and Cost to Establish a 
Substantial Burden in the Land Use Context Violate Federalism 
When a court interprets “substantial burden” under either the First 
Amendment or RLUIPA to hold that cost and convenience are suffi-
cient in a land use case, it impermissibly interferes with and compro-
mises local and state control over land use.  While the federal gov-
ernment has imposed upon local and state governments to prevent 
and deter discrimination based on race, color, national origin, reli-
gion, sex, familial status, and handicap (through the Fair Housing 
Act, for example),68 its reach has not extended to the sorts of land use 
issues burdened by RLUIPA.  These concerns include setbacks, 
height restrictions, lot size requirements, and the other standard local 
issues in these processes, which are unique to each community. 
Whether secular or religious, landowners often experience cost and 
inconvenience as part of the land use process, as most zoning laws are 
neutral and of general applicability.  RLUIPA is only triggered if 
there has been an individualized assessment.69  As discussed above, 
 
Constitutional Limitations on Congress’s Power over Local Land Use, supra note 2, 
at 426. 
 68. The Fair Housing Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2006). 
 69. See, e.g., Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 
F.3d 253, 273–74 (3d Cir. 2007) (following the Tenth Circuit’s approach to individual-
ized assessments and finding that even if a zoning ordinance allows for some individ-
ualized determinations, it does not trigger strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise 
Clause if it is secularly motivated and it affects all landowners seeking land in the ar-
ea equally); Westchester Day Sch., 504 F.3d at 354 (finding RLUIPA’s jurisdictional 
element met under the Commerce Clause in response to plaintiff’s assertion “that the 
substantial burden on its religious exercise affects interstate commerce and that it is 
imposed through formal procedures that permit the government to make individual-
ized assessments of the proposed uses for the property involved,” but not reaching 
the question of the 14th Amendment’s Section 5 powers); Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of 
Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding RLUIPA ap-
plicable because the zoning board’s determination of whether to grant a permit was 
an “individualized” assessment, as it took into account the particular details of the 
applicant before it); Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 
643, 654–55 (10th Cir. 2006) (discussing the “individualized exceptions” inquiry under 
the Free Exercise Clause and noting that exemption-free laws are considered gener-
ally applicable and religious groups cannot claim a right to exemption, but when the 
law has secular exemptions, a challenge by a religious group becomes possible be-
cause subjective assessment systems inviting consideration of the particular circum-
stances behind an applicant’s actions triggers strict scrutiny); Reaching Hearts Int’l, 
Inc. v. Prince George’s Cnty., 584 F. Supp. 2d 766, 784 (D. Md. 2008), aff’d, 368 F. 
App’x 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting numerous individual assessments made “over 
the course of the three years in which RHI presented applications to build its church 
in conformity with the applicable laws at the time” and discussing RLUIPA’s legisla-
tive history). 
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cost and inconvenience have been insufficient to show a due process 
violation for the secular landowner.70 
Courts have been hesitant to apply the cost or convenience stand-
ard in due process claims because: 
[E]very appeal by a disappointed developer from an adverse ruling 
by a local . . . planning board necessarily involves some claim that 
the board exceeded, abused or “distorted” its legal authority in some 
manner, often for some allegedly perverse (from the developer’s 
point of view) reason. For that reason, we have generally been hesi-
tant to “involve federal courts in the rights and wrongs of local plan-
ning disputes’ unless there is a ‘truly horrendous situation [ ]”71 
There is no better argument in the free exercise context.  The use 
of these criteria to trigger free exercise protection is in direct conflict 
with the long line of Supreme Court cases that have held that the 
courts should not interfere with local land use decisions. 72 
In contrast, the circuits that have rejected convenience and expense 
have crafted standards that are consistent with federalism.  For in-
 
 70. See supra notes 44–53 and accompanying text. 
 71. Mongeau v. City of Marlborough, 492 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Creative Env’ts v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 833 (1st Cir. 1982) and Nestor Colon Me-
dina & Sucesores, Inc. v. Custodio, 964 F.2d 32, 45 (1st Cir. 1992) (internal citations 
omitted)).  
 72. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 482–83 (2005) (recogniz-
ing the deference owed to local officials in exercises in urban planning and develop-
ment); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 
(2002) (holding mere enactment of regulations implementing moratoria against all 
viable economic use of petitioners’ property did not constitute a per se taking under 
the Fifth Amendment); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps. of 
Eng’rs., 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (noting that States hold traditional and primary 
power over land and water use); Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 
30, 44 (1994) (“[R]egulation of land use [is] a function traditionally performed by lo-
cal governments.”); Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Miss., 456 U.S. 742, 767 n.30 
(1982) (“[R]egulation of land use is perhaps the quintessential state activity.”); Lake 
Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 402 (1979) 
(“The regulation of land use is traditionally a function performed by local govern-
ments.”); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 
(1977) (explaining that because legislators and administrators are properly concerned 
with balancing numerous competing considerations in zoning decisions, courts should 
refrain from reviewing the merits of their decisions absent a showing of arbitrariness, 
irrationality, or proof of discriminatory purpose); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 
n.18 (1975) (“[Z]oning laws and their provisions, long considered essential to effec-
tive urban planning, are peculiarly within the province of state and local legislative 
authorities.”); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (upholding Congress’s police 
power over the District of Columbia to enact a redevelopment project to improve 
public health and safety); Hairston v. Danville & W. Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 607 (1908) 
(deferring to the state and local governments on land use and zoning issues). 
HAMILTON_CHRISTENSEN 7/11/2012  9:24 AM 
2012] RLUIPA IS A BRIDGE TOO FAR 983 
stance, the Eleventh Circuit has found that a substantial burden must 
genuinely disrupt a religious landowner from engaging in his religion. 
[A] “substantial burden” must place more than an inconvenience on 
religious exercise; a “substantial burden” is akin to significant pres-
sure which directly coerces the religious adherent to conform his or 
her behavior accordingly.  Thus, a substantial burden can result from 
pressure that tends to force adherents to forego religious precepts or 
from pressure that mandates religious conduct.73 
This is the sort of standard that can divide the potentially discrimi-
natory from the non-discriminatory cases.  If the religious adherent is 
not experiencing a substantial burden in this vein, free exercise is 
carte blanche for religious entities to use their status to game the land 
use system. 
B. The Criteria of Cost and Inconvenience in the Land Use 
Context Violate the Establishment Clause 
Secular land developers have been incentivized to factor cost and 
convenience associated with land use into their calculations when 
they undertake a major project.  They have due process rights against 
arbitrary and capricious or irrational decisions, and against decisions 
that “shock the conscience,” but they must also factor the ordinary 
costs of development into their calculations.74  Until RLUIPA, reli-
gious landowners had the same incentives to handle their financial af-
fairs.  Now the courts have created the possibility that in some juris-
dictions they will be able to overcome local land use law even if the 
only burden is the ordinary burden of all developers. 
This is a financial privilege that violates the Establishment Clause.  
First, it is financial support for religious exercise, including worship 
and mission.75  “The Establishment Clause prohibits ‘sponsorship, fi-
 
 73. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 
2004). 
 74. See supra text accompanying notes 25, 28. 
 75. See, e.g., Sts. Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of 
New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895, 901 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding substantial burden on religious 
Church since they would have been forced to accrue “delay, uncertainty, and ex-
pense” by “search[ing] around for other parcels of land . . . or . . . continu[ing] filing 
applications with the City.”); Barr v. City of Sinton, 295 S.W.3d 287, 301–02 (Tex. 
2009) (finding Texas zoning law unconstitutional after fact-specific inquiry, conduct-
ed from perspective of worshiper, into burden on religious worship). 
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nancial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious 
activity.’”76 
Second, by treating cost and convenience as adequate to show a 
substantial burden on religious exercise by religious landowners, the 
treatment of landowners across the community is no longer neutral.77 
Government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral 
in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice.  It may not be 
hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of nonreligion; and it may 
not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against 
another or even against the militant opposite.  The First Amend-
ment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and reli-
gion, and between religion and nonreligion.78 
Third, the land use context is a zero-sum game, so that when the re-
ligious landowner can trump the local land use laws through 
RLUIPA, it is pushing back against the interests behind the law.  
Thus, a religious landowner who circumvents the restrictions in a res-
idential neighborhood undermines the interests of the neighboring 
homeowners and, actually, all homeowners in the community who 
face the same scenario in future.  The financial privilege that flows 
from being able to satisfy “substantial burden” with evidence of mere 
inconvenience or cost thus disables the residential neighbors.  In addi-
tion, the costs of the process are shifted from the religious landowner 
to the taxpayers and neighbors.  Yet, “government . . . may not place 
its prestige, coercive authority, or resources behind a single religious 
faith or behind religious belief in general, compelling nonadherents to 
support the practices or proselytizing of favored religious organiza-
tions and conveying the message that those who do not contribute 
gladly are less than full members of the community.”79 
Land use cases are most closely analogous to the tax cases, in which 
the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that opposition to a 
government expenditure or tax can exempt the religious believer 
from the obligation to comply with a neutral, generally applicable 
 
 76. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 393 
(1990).   
 77. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (dis-
cussing the “wholesome neutrality” principle which stems from “the teachings of his-
tory that powerful sects or groups might bring about a . . .  dependency of one upon 
the other to the end that official support of the . . . Government would be placed be-
hind the tenets of one or of all orthodoxies.”) 
 78. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1968).  
 79. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9 (1989).  
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law.80  Similarly, parents who send their children to private, religious 
schools do not have a corresponding right to avoid paying taxes that 
support the public schools.  Religious believers are required to be 
contributing members of the community at large, even when they do 
not agree with all of the government’s decisions.  RLUIPA has re-
versed this norm, inviting religious landowners to believe that they do 
not need to consider, take into account, or be accountable to the im-
pact of their land uses on others.  Indeed, in a number of recent cases, 
they have refused to participate in the process at all.81 
When non-religious landowners’ property values change or the 
character of their neighborhood or community is altered because of 
the imposition of the religious organization’s religious vision and mis-
sion, they suffer from the discrimination that results from the favorit-
ism that RLUIPA fosters.  RLUIPA further invites local govern-
ments, avoiding expensive litigation, to approve the creation of 
religiously defined enclaves, which alienate and disenfranchise 
nonadherents in the community.  It is commonplace for existing 
neighbors concerned about the introduction of an intense religious 
use to be told that they should not care, because the entering religious 
believers will buy them out.82 
These three factors, taken alone or together, violate fundamental 
principles reflected in the Establishment Clause and promulgated by 
the Framers themselves: “It is sufficient to note that for the men who 
wrote the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment the ‘establish-
ment’ of a religion connoted sponsorship, financial support, and ac-
tive involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”83 
In drafting the First Amendment, Madison was concerned not only 
about the union of church and state power, but also the raw accumu-
lation of too much power in the hands of religion.84  Proponents of 
 
 80. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982). 
 81. See Congregation Anshei Roosevelt v. Planning & Zoning Bd. of Roosevelt, 
338 F. App’x 214, 218–19 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding claim was not ripe for review be-
cause Congregation did not even apply for zoning variance prior to bringing 
RLUIPA claim); Congregation Rabbinical Coll. of Tartikov, Inc. v. Vill. of Pomona, 
No. 7:07-CV-06304-KMK (S.D.N.Y. argued May 20, 2009). 
 82. See AMERICA’S HOLY WAR (Moon Dance Films 2011); Statement of a neigh-
bor of a Mormon Temple in Belmont, Mass. (on file with author). 
 83. Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).    
 84. See Ralph L. Ketcham, James Madison and Religion, a New Hypothesis, in 
JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 175, 188 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1985); id. at 
191 (stating that Madison believed that a “[u]nion of religious sentiments begets a 
surprising confidence, and ecclesiastical establishments tend to great ignorance and 
corruption; all of which facilitate the execution of mischievous projects.” Madison 
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RLUIPA argue that there is nothing wrong with allowing religious in-
stitutions to stand on “equal” footing with secular institutions.  The 
“cost” and “inconvenience” standard proffered by some courts, how-
ever, is hardly equal, and vests religious institutions with an enormous 
newfound power that secular land owners do not have. 
Without RLUIPA, religious landowners could still bring Free Ex-
ercise claims under neutral, generally applicable zoning laws that sub-
stantially burdened the free exercise of their religion.  RLUIPA’s en-
couragement of a cost or inconvenience analysis, however, is a clear 
violation of Madison’s Establishment principle.  The Establishment 
Clause was enacted to protect society from religion cloaking itself in 
state power or leveraging state resources to its own ends.85  By meas-
uring the level of “inconvenience” of a religious landowner, the fed-
eral government has made it possible for religious institutions to 
commandeer and take advantage of the state and local governments 
and their relevant communities. 
CONCLUSION 
Causing religious organizations to experience inconvenience or ex-
pense in the land use context is a far cry from the alleged widespread 
discrimination that was the purported basis for RLUIPA.  When stat-
utes are enacted solely based on one side’s self-interested studies and 
preferences, as with RLUIPA, the law of unintended consequences 
has special force.86  RLUIPA has invaded residential neighborhoods 
and disabled opponents of ambitious land use projects wherever the 
developer is a religious entity or person.87  Part of its invasiveness is a 
 
also stated that “a variety of sects” is necessary to avoid tyranny resulting where 
there is a “majority of any sect.”).  
 85. See generally Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 
8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 183–91 (Robert A. Rutland & William M.E. 
Rachal eds., 1973) (chronicling Madison’s opposition to a Virginia legislative initia-
tive to subsidize religion in the 1780s). 
 86. See Federalism and the Public Good, supra note 7 at 333–34 (explaining that 
after the Court invalidated RFRA, Congress introduced the Religious Liberty Pro-
tection Acts of 1998 and 1999 (RLPA), but these acts were withdrawn and instead of 
holding new hearings to consider RLUIPA, Congress relied on the evidence present-
ed during RLPA’s hearings, and RLUIPA is not supported by an independent Con-
gressional record).  
 87. See id.; see also, e.g., Daniel P. Lennington, Thou Shalt Not Zone: The Over-
broad Applications and Troubling Implications of RLUIPA’s Land Use Provisions, 
29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 805, 841 (2006) (“[A] statute that Congress meant to be a tool 
against intentional religious discrimination [has instead been] an impediment to the 
valid application of local zoning ordinances.”); Kevin M. Powers, The Sword and the 
Shield: RLUIPA and the New Battle Ground of Religious Freedom, 22 BUFF. PUB. 
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result of unconstitutional interpretations of the plaintiff’s burden in 
proving “substantial burden.”  Just as the Framers would have ex-
pected, an entity with power—in this case, religious landowners—
have pushed to obtain even more than they have been given. 
The proponents of RLUIPA have tried numerous rhetorical tricks 
to make it sound as though it was an ordinary statute needed to aid 
against discrimination.  One of those ruses is to characterize it as 
though it was passed unanimously, which puts pressure on courts to 
think twice before invalidating it.  RLUIPA was not passed unani-
mously.  Rather, it was passed by “unanimous consent,” after all 
members in opposition, and most other members as well, had left for 
the 2000 summer break.  Unanimous consent is a procedure by which 
the leadership brings bills to the floor with few members present.88  
To label RLUIPA’s passage as either a “unanimous vote” or even a 
“unanimous voice vote” is incorrect and misleading. 
It is also misleading to equate inconvenience and expense in the 
land use context with discrimination.  Cost and inconvenience are the 
price developers pay to obtain approvals.  When a religious developer 
can avoid either simply because it is religious—whether under the 
First Amendment or the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act—the principles of federalism and separation of church 
and state have been sacrificed. 
 
INT. L.J. 145, 146  (2004) (noting that RLUIPA is a “potent weapon in the quiver of 
religious groups”); Note, Religious Land Use in the Federal Courts After RLUIPA, 
120 HARV. L. REV. 2178, 2179 (2007) (discussing how “RLUIPA has not only re-
stored the right to religious exemptions from land use laws to its pre-Smith status, but 
also broadened this right considerably.”); Corey Mertes, Note, God’s Little Acre: Re-
ligious Land Use and the Separation of Church and State, 74 UMKC L. REV. 221, 
234–35 (2005) (crediting RLUIPA’s “substantial and negative” impact on city gov-
ernments to the Department of Justice’s “unusually active role” in supporting reli-
gious plaintiffs as “part of a larger assault on the wall traditionally separating church 
and state”); Sara Smolik, Note, The Utility and Efficacy of the RLUIPA: Was It a 
Waste?, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 723, 759 (2004) (explaining that RLUIPA has 
created “an atmosphere in which religious liberty is more easily protected by courts 
uncertain of how far to push the limits of Smith”). 
 88. Letter from Mark Strand, Adjunct Professor of Legislative Politics at George 
Washington University Graduate School of Political Management, to author (Mar. 5, 
2012) (on file with the author). 
